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Abstract	  	  
The research presented is a collaboration between social 
scientists, designers and technologists that explored whether 
critical design could be used to envision cyber security futures. The 
research imperative was to examine the use of critical design as a 
way of imagining future or alternative scenarios of cyber security. 
We evaluated research methods that would encourage cyber 
security practitioners and policy makers to discuss and re-consider 
cyber security risk. 
The research used critical design to produce speculative scenarios 
that would encourage a new way of thinking about cyber security 
risk. ‘Specimens of IT Fauna’ is a visualisation and celebration of 
our imaginary bestiary of software. ‘Crime Pays’ is a video 
installation that envisions a future where there is effectively a tax on 
online privacy.  
The artefacts were used in two workshops to encourage cyber 
security practitioners and policy makers to envision future risk 
scenarios.  The research demonstrated that while there is potential 
for using critical design in this way there is a need to develop a 
bridge between the artefacts produced through critical design and 
the epistemological position traditionally taken towards risk by 
cyber security practitioners and policy makers.  We conclude that 
future research should link critical design with systems thinking as 
the next step in developing tools for envisioning future cyber 
security risk.  This will offer a structured way for moving to a more 
productive level of engagement with the artefacts while giving 
participants a license to be creative and a way of incorporating the 
human experience. 
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Research	  Imperatives	  	  
The research outlined in this paper was part of a larger project 
called Visualisation and Other Methods of Expression (VOME).  
The VOME research was located in the relatively young research 
discipline of cyber security and focused on issues of privacy, 
identity and consent in online environments and engaging primarily 
with end user communities. The research explored the use of novel 
methods of engagement and an early outcome was the recognition 
of a need to ‘design culturally sympathetic research approaches’ 
(Coles-Kemp and Ashenden, 2012, p.2) to understand how end 




SN6 8LA UK 
d.m.ashenden@cranfield.ac.uk 
David	  Benqué	  
Royal College of Art 
david.benque@network.rca.ac.uk 
Austin	  Houldsworth	  




	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Research	  Through	  Design	  2013	  
 
During the course of the research, however, the importance of 
engaging with cyber security practitioners and policy makers 
instead of just end users became clear.  As a result the VOME 
researchers came together with designers to explore the use of 
critical design to engage with cyber security practitioners and 
policy makers.  Accordingly, the research presented here 
examines the use of critical design as tool for imagining future 
cyber security risks.   
The analytical approach for the research is critical design which 
creates ‘provocative artefacts’ (Dunne and Raby, 2001, p.63) 
by using critical theory with design to make us think about 
things we believe we know in new and different ways.  Such 
artefacts are often more effective than direct questioning 
techniques in enabling user communities to engage with future 
possibilities (Bowen, 2007).  Critical design offers a 
participatory practice approach and so continues the VOME 
research theme of exploring novel methods of engagement.   
As such, critical design was thought to be an appropriate tool 
for developing ways to envision cyber security risk.  	  
Research	  Process	  
We started with an initial consultation workshop where cyber 
security academics explored what the impact of new, online 
security technologies might be on our society and culture. 
Following on from this there were informal discussions to share 
the existing research output from the VOME project with the 
designers.  The aim of these initial discussions and workshops 
was to find a common ground for exchange between designers 
and experts. Narrative was used as a tool through exercises 
such as improvisation from random prompts and the creation of 
fictional tabloid articles. Both parties were able to collaborate 
on stories, then examine and discuss them. 
Designers then used these exercises as a starting point to  
formulate more specific and nuanced stories.  In the case of Crime 
Pays, this led to the imagination of a future scenario and payment 
system, while Specimens of IT Fauna focuses on existing but 
overlooked narratives and metaphors used to describe the internet.  
Artefacts were then designed within these narratives premises, 
giving the stories and ideas a tangible physical presence and 
enabling further dissemination and discussion.  
Specimens of IT Fauna (Fig. 1) was designed with educational 
props in mind, referencing the science classroom. The small scale 
of the objects and the explanatory labeling encourages 
manipulation and discussion while the use of laser etching and 
lighting provides an aesthetic ‘hook’ and a sense of technological 
wonder. 
The Crime Pays (Fig. 2) video mimics the aesthetic qualities of a 
corporate presentation and only the filmic letterbox format hints that 
this is fiction. The video brings ‘The Yes Men’ activist approach into 
a consenting corporate conference and invites the expert audience 
to play along. Within a workshop setting the video is displayed 
alongside photographs depicting three imagined social scenes. The 
minimalist style of these photos is intended to push the characters 
human interaction to the foreground, thereby directing discussions 
from the abstract system to the possible impact on people’s lives. 
We subsequently ran two workshops to showcase the artefacts and 
to explore their use as ways of envisioning cyber security future 
risk.  The workshops were held at the British Computer Society in 
London – a venue where it was believed that participants (working 
in the field of cyber security) would feel comfortable.  Participants 
were self-selecting as the workshops were publicized through 
existing networks for cyber security practitioners and policy makers. 
There were twelve attendees at each workshop and each workshop 
was three hours in length.  The workshops started with a short 
presentation to set the context of cyber security risk and critical 
design and this was followed by the designers introducing the 
artefacts.  Participants were then encouraged to ask questions, 
Figure 1. Specimens of IT Fauna 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (1 of 3 models) 
Laser etched crystal - other models in the 
series are ‘Blaster Worm’ and ‘Web 
Crawler’. 	  
Figure 2. Crime Pays: Some grease to 
seal the deal (1 of 3 photos). Video and 
three photographs depicting social change 
as a result of the new payment system. 
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discuss with each other and reflect on the artefacts.  Their outputs 
were captured on ‘post-it’ notes as well as rich-pictures drawings. 
Research	  Outcomes	  
Please describe the resulting knowledge that arose from the 
practice-based research. This should be placed in the context of an 
existing disciplinary body of knowledge through the use of 
references. 
 
Cyber security risk has traditionally been encapsulated by the 
engineering and physical sciences where risk is seen as knowable 
and measurable.  The potential value, however, of cyber security 
risk artefacts for ‘interpretively expressing professional knowledge’ 
(Baskerville, 1991, p.749) has been suggested and the Blackett 
Review on ‘High Impact Low Probability Risks (Government Office 
for Science, 2011,) concluded that there is a need for tools that will 
allow experts to imagine risks in a way that will ‘expand the 
boundaries of their mental models’ (p.11). 
Accordingly the aim of this research was to evaluate the use of 
critical design as a research technique for imagining future cyber 
security risk.  We wanted to move beyond the approaches used in 
VOME and towards a future-looking, creative approach with a 
practitioner and policy maker user community.  We learned three 
lessons through the workshops.   
Firstly, it takes effort for participants to become engaged and 
conversant with critical design artefacts and there was initial 
confusion over the purpose and use of the artefacts presented.  In 
time, however, participants commented that the artefacts made 
them realise how they had become ‘dependent on a common 
language’ within their field of expertise and that ‘it’s hard to move 
past that’.  They did feel that the pieces gave a ‘different 
perspective’, that made them ‘think differently’ and realize, ‘how we 
have normalized images’.  While they were beginning to engage in 
self-reflection it was difficult to move them beyond this to a more 
future-thinking level of engagement. 
Secondly, participants needed to be given a license to be creative.  
They had a tendency to retreat to what they have already 
experienced or believed to be true.  This was demonstrated in 
references to practical questions about cyber security ‘‘where are 
the boundaries to defend – in the cloud, at the end of a network, in 
a device, or in the user’s heads?’ and citing of specific 
implementations of technology such as, ‘Mondex, c1993, Natwest’ 
(the unsuccessful invention of an electronic cash system by the 
National Westminster bank). 
Thirdly, participants needed to understand how the artefacts could 
be experienced.  They felt that the artefacts would be 
‘comprehensible by mums (and dads)’ but that, ‘they [IT Fauna] 
need a narrative’.  They needed to see how others experienced 
these artefacts and asked, ‘where is the human element?’ 
commenting that the artefacts needed to be ‘user activity based’.  
One participant pointed out that ‘the internet is entirely experiential 
– this is where the art should focus’.  
Conclusion	  
Critical design for research is often used in the development of new 
technologies or products.  In this research, however, we were 
exploring its use as part of the risk assessment process for cyber 
security.  The lessons we learned demonstrate that while there is 
potential for using critical design in this way we need to develop a 
bridge between the artefacts and the epistemological position 
traditionally taken towards risk by cyber security practitioners and 
policy makers.  In the next phase of the research we will aim to link 
critical design with systems thinking as a further development of 
tools for imaging future cyber security risk.  This may well offer a 
structured way for moving to a more productive level of 
engagement with the artefacts while giving participants a license to 
be creative and a way of incorporating the human experience. 
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